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Abstract
In this paper we show that existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in the
Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with
investment, entry, and exit requires admissibility of mixed entry/exit strategies, con-
trary to Ericson & Pakes's (1995) assertion. This is problematic because the existing
algorithms cannot cope with mixed strategies. To establish a ¯rm basis for computing
dynamic industry equilibria, we introduce ¯rm heterogeneity in the form of randomly
drawn, privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model. We show that the
resulting game of incomplete information always has a MPE in cuto® entry/exit strate-
gies and is computationally no more demanding than the original game of complete
information. Building on our basic existence result, we ¯rst show that a symmetric and
anonymous MPE exists under appropriate assumptions on the model's primitives. Sec-
ond, we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes
degenerate, MPEs in cuto® entry/exit strategies converge to MPEs in mixed entry/exit
strategies of the game of complete information. Next, we provide a condition on the
model's primitives that ensures the existence of a MPE in pure investment strategies.
Finally, we provide the ¯rst example of multiple symmetric and anonymous MPEs in
this literature.
1 Introduction
The empirical literature on industry dynamics has established two key ¯ndings (Dunne,
Roberts & Samuelson 1988). First, entry and exit occur simultaneously. Second, there
is heterogeneity among ¯rms, and this heterogeneity evolves endogenously in response to
random occurrences, for example, in the investment process. To capture these ¯ndings,
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1Ericson & Pakes (1995) develop a general model that tracks an oligopolistic industry over
time. In each period, incumbent ¯rms decide whether to remain in the industry and how
much to invest, and potential entrants decide whether to enter the industry. Once the
investment, entry, and exit decisions are made, ¯rms compete in the product market. Firm
heterogeneity is accounted for by encoding all payo®-relevant characteristics of a ¯rm in its
\state." For example, a ¯rm's state may describe its production capacity, cost structure, or
the quality of its product. A ¯rm is able to change its state over time through investment,
and the variability in the fortunes of seemingly similar ¯rms is captured by an idiosyncratic
shock that a®ects a ¯rm's transition from one state to another. Since the Ericson & Pakes
(1995) model is by far too complex to be solved analytically, Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001)
provide algorithms to compute a pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this
dynamic stochastic game.
Although the framework laid out by Ericson & Pakes (1995) is attractive and has been
widely applied (see Pakes (2000) for a survey), its theoretical foundations are wanting. Due
to a shortcoming in Ericson & Pakes's (1995) argument, it is unknown whether or not a
MPE exists and, if it exists, whether or not it is unique. Since any attempt to compute a
nonexistent equilibrium is doomed, resolving the existence issue is clearly critical. However,
given that the purpose of Ericson & Pakes's (1995) framework is to provide a computable
model of dynamic industry equilibrium, two additional and equally important issues arise.
First, computing mixed strategies over discrete actions such as entry and exit in dynamic
stochastic games poses a formidable challenge despite the considerable progress that has
been made in the context of ¯nite games (see McKelvey & McLennan (1996)). More-
over, computing mixed strategies over continuous actions such as investment is infeasible
at present. It is thus vital to guarantee existence of a MPE in pure strategies. Second, the
state space of the model explodes in the number of ¯rms and quickly overwhelms current
computational capabilities. An important means of mitigating this \curse of dimensional-
ity" is to focus attention on symmetric and anonymous MPEs. If no such MPE exists, then
this is a fruitless approach.
This paper resolves all the above issues: We establish that a symmetric and anonymous
MPE in pure strategies always exists under reasonable conditions. We furthermore demon-
strate that the MPE is not necessarily unique. These results are tailored to the speci¯cs
of the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model and ful¯ll the goal of providing a ¯rm basis for com-
puting dynamic industry equilibria using existing algorithms|notably Pakes & McGuire
(1994, 2001).
There are three di±culties in devising a computationally tractable model. First, the
existence of an equilibrium cannot be ensured without allowing ¯rms to randomize, in some
way or another, over discrete actions. To eliminate the need for mixed entry/exit strategies
without jeopardizing existence, we generalize an idea that Pakes & McGuire (1994) sug-
gested to overcome convergence problems in their algorithm: treating a potential entrant's
2setup cost as a random variable. In accordance with Harsanyi's (1973) technique for purify-
ing mixed-strategy equilibria, we assume that at the beginning of each period each potential
entrant is assigned a random setup cost payable upon entry, and each incumbent ¯rm is
assigned a random scrap value received upon exit. Setup costs/scrap values are privately
known, i.e., while a ¯rm learns its own setup cost/scrap value prior to making its decisions,
its rivals' setup costs/scrap values remain unknown to it. Adding ¯rm heterogeneity in the
form of these randomly drawn, privately known setup costs/scrap values leads to a game of
incomplete information. This game always has a MPE in cuto® entry/exit strategies which
can be handled by existing algorithms. Although a ¯rm formally follows a pure strategy in
making its entry/exit decision, the dependence of its entry/exit decision on its randomly
drawn, privately known setup cost/scrap value implies that its rivals perceive the ¯rm as
if it were following a mixed strategy. Harsanyi's (1973) insight that a perturbed game of
incomplete information can purify the mixed-strategy equilibria of an underlying game of
complete information enables us to settle the ¯rst di±culty in devising a computationally
tractable model.
The second di±culty is to ensure pure investment strategies. The extant literature (see
Mertens (2002) for a survey) routinely allows for randomization over continuous actions.
Computing mixed strategies over continuous actions, however, is not practical. We therefore
have to make sure that a ¯rm's optimal investment level is always unique, for that guarantees
that the MPE is in pure investment strategies. To achieve this, we de¯ne a class of transition
functions, functions which specify how ¯rms' investment decisions a®ect the industry's state-
to-state transitions, that we call unique investment choice (UIC) admissible and prove that if
the transition function is UIC admissible, then a ¯rm's investment choice is indeed uniquely
determined. UIC admissibility is an easily veri¯able condition on the model's primitives
and, as we discuss below, is not unduly restrictive on the transition functions that it admits.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that establishes existence of a MPE in
pure strategies for a variety of dynamic stochastic games whose structures are tailored to
represent situations of economic interest. Curtat (1996) does so in a game with a continuum
of states by assuming that the per-period payo®s as well as the transition distribution
function satisfy monotonicity, supermodularity, and dominant-diagonal conditions. This
entails restrictions on how per-period payo®s can vary with the state whereas our approach
accommodates arbitrary per-period payo®s. Bergin & Bernhardt (1995) and Chakrabarti
(2003) analyze dynamic stochastic games with a continuum of players. Chakrabarti (2003)
shows that there exists a MPE in pure strategies in such a game provided that the per-
period payo®s and the transition density function depend only on the average response of
the players. Our approach complements this literature by providing a di®erent, and very
intuitive, su±cient condition for existence of a MPE in pure strategies in a broad class of
dynamic stochastic games.
The third and ¯nal di±culty in devising a computationally tractable model is to en-
3sure that the MPE is not only in pure strategies, but also symmetric and anonymous.
We show that this is the case under appropriate assumptions on the model's primitives.
Symmetry and anonymity are important because they ease the computational burden con-
siderably. Instead of having to compute value functions (i.e., payo®s) and policy functions
(i.e., strategies) for all ¯rms, under symmetry and anonymity it su±ces to compute value
and policy functions for one ¯rm. In addition, symmetry and anonymity reduce the size of
the state space on which these functions are de¯ned. Besides its computational advantages,
a symmetric and anonymous MPE is an especially convincing solution concept in models of
dynamic competition with entry and exit because there is often no reason why a particular
entrant should be di®erent from any other entrant. Rather, ¯rm heterogeneity must arise
endogenously from the idiosyncratic outcomes that the ex ante identical ¯rms realize from
their investments.
With these di±culties tamed, our existence proof is straightforward. For the most part
we adapt the argument of Whitt (1980) to a setting with incomplete information. While
the literature provides several existence theorems for dynamic stochastic games with a ¯nite
state space and a continuum of actions (e.g., Federgruen 1978), they all allow for mixed
strategies in establishing existence of a MPE that is neither guaranteed to be symmetric
nor anonymous. We are unable to simply cite these existence theorems because a MPE
must not involve mixed strategies and it must be symmetric and anonymous in order to be
suitable for computation.
In addition to introducing random scrap values/setup costs, our model relaxes two
restrictive features of the entry process speci¯ed by Ericson & Pakes (1995). First, while
more than one incumbent ¯rm can exit the industry per period, at most one potential
entrant can enter it. Second, an entrant is randomly assigned to an arbitrary position
and thus has no control over its initial position within in the industry. These features are
especially troublesome because industry evolution frequently takes the form of a preemption
race (Besanko & Doraszelski 2002, Doraszelski & Markovich 2003, Langohr 2003). During
such a race, ¯rms invest heavily as long as they are neck-and-neck. But once one of the
¯rms manages to pull ahead, the lagging ¯rms \give up," thereby allowing the leading ¯rm
to attain a dominant position. In a preemption race, an early entrant has a head start over
a late entrant, and an imposed order of entry may prove to be decisive for the structure of
the industry. Our speci¯cation of the entry process does not su®er from this drawback. By
assuming that entry decisions, like exit decisions, are made simultaneously, we allow more
than one ¯rm to enter the industry per period. Moreover, we allow an entrant to make an
initial investment in order to improve the odds that it enters the industry in a more favorable
state. Taken together, these changes make the model more realistic by endogenizing the
intensity of entry activity. As an additional bene¯t, our parallel treatment of entry and exit
as well as incumbents' and entrants' investment decisions simpli¯es the model's exposition
and eases the computational burden.
4The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we develop the model. In Section
3 we provide a series of simple examples to illustrate the key themes of the subsequent
analysis. Our ¯rst example shows that if scrap values/setup costs are constant across
¯rms and periods as in Ericson & Pakes (1995), then a symmetric MPE in pure entry/exit
strategies may fail to exist, contrary to the assertion of Ericson & Pakes (1995). Our second
example shows how the incorporation of random scrap values/setup costs ensures that a
symmetric MPE in cuto® entry/exit strategies exists and that this MPE converges to the
MPE in mixed entry/exit strategies of the original game as the randomness in the scrap
values/setup costs vanishes. In the remainder of Section 3 we argue that the incomplete-
information game is computationally no more demanding than the complete-information
game and demonstrate how it can be solved using a slightly modi¯ed version of Pakes &
McGuire's (1994) algorithm.
In Section 4, we turn to full-°edged incomplete-information game with investment in
addition to entry and exit. In Section 4.1 we establish from ¯rst principles that there is a
MPE in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment strategies. While such a MPE is computable,
the burden may be substantial. In Section 4.2 we therefore adapt our basic existence
proof to show existence of a symmetric and anonymous MPE in cuto® entry/exit and pure
investment strategies. In Section 4.3 we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap
values/setup costs becomes degenerate, a MPE in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment
strategies of the incomplete-information game converges to a MPE in mixed entry/exit and
pure investment strategies of the complete-information game. This immediately implies that
there exists a MPE in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model provided that mixed entry/exit
strategies are admissible. Moreover, to the extent that incomplete information is viewed
as a \computational trick" rather than an accurate description of industry fundamentals,
the addition of random scrap values/setup costs does not change the nature of strategic
interactions among ¯rms.
In Section 5 we de¯ne UIC admissibility of the transition function and prove that this
condition on the model's primitives is su±cient for the uniqueness of a ¯rm's investment
choice. It thus guarantees existence of a MPE in pure investment strategies. While the
transition functions used in the vast majority of applications of Ericson & Pakes's (1995)
framework are UIC admissible, they all have restricted a ¯rm to transit to immediately
adjacent states. Our condition establishes that this is unnecessarily restrictive, and we
show exactly how to specify more general UIC admissible transition functions.
To our knowledge, all applications of Ericson & Pakes's (1995) framework have found
a single MPE. We settle the uniqueness issue in Section 6 by providing examples of multi-
ple symmetric and anonymous MPEs. Whereas Pakes & McGuire (1994) conjecture that
nonuniqueness might result from ¯rms' entry/exit decisions, our main example does not
rely on this. Rather, nonuniqueness results solely from ¯rms' investment decisions. Section
7 concludes.
52 Model
We study the evolution of an industry with heterogeneous ¯rms. The model is dynamic,
time is discrete, and the horizon is in¯nite. There are two groups of ¯rms, incumbent ¯rms
and potential entrants. An incumbent ¯rm has to decide each period whether to remain in
the industry and, if so, how much to invest. A potential entrant has to decide whether to
enter the industry and, if so, how much to invest. Once these decisions are made, product
market competition takes place.
Our model accounts for ¯rm heterogeneity in two ways. First, we encode all character-
istics that are relevant to a ¯rm's pro¯t from product market competition (e.g., production
capacity, cost structure, or product quality) in its \state." A ¯rm is able to change its
state over time through investment. While a higher investment today is no guarantee for
a more favorable state tomorrow, it does ensure a more favorable distribution over future
states. By acknowledging that a ¯rm's transition from one state to another is subject to
an idiosyncratic shock, our model allows for variability in the fortunes of ¯rms even if they
carry out identical strategies. Second, to account for di®erences in opportunity costs across
¯rms we assume that incumbents have random scrap values (received upon exit) and that
entrants have random setup costs (payable upon entry). Since a ¯rm's particular circum-
stances change over time, we model scrap values and setup costs as being drawn anew each
period.
States and ¯rms. Let N denote the number of ¯rms. Firm n is described by its state
!n 2 ­ where ­ = f1;:::;M;M + 1g is its set of possible states. States 1;:::;M describe
an active ¯rm while state M +1 identi¯es the ¯rm as being inactive.1 At any point in time
the industry is completely characterized by the list of ¯rms' states ! = (!1;:::;!N) 2 S
where S = ­N is the state space.2 We refer to !n as the state of ¯rm n and to ! as the
state of the industry.
If N¤ is the number of incumbent ¯rms (i.e., active ¯rms), then there are N ¡ N¤
potential entrants (i.e., inactive ¯rms). Thus, once an incumbent ¯rm exits the industry, a
potential entrant automatically takes its \slot" and has to decide whether or not to enter
the industry.3Potential entrants are drawn from a large pool. They are short-lived and
base their entry decisions on the net present value of entering today; potential entrants
do not take the option value of delaying entry into account. In contrast, incumbent ¯rms
are long-lived and solve intertemporal maximization problems to reach their exit decisions.
1This formulation allows ¯rms to di®er from each other in more than one dimension. Suppose that a ¯rm
is characterized by its capacity and its marginal cost of production. If there are M1 levels of capacity and
M2 levels of cost, then each of the M = M1M2 possible combinations of capacity and cost de¯nes a state.
2Time-varying characteristics of the competitive environment are easily added to the description of the
industry. Besanko & Doraszelski (2002), for example, add a demand state to the list of ¯rms' states in order
to study the e®ects of demand growth and demand cycles on capacity dynamics.
3Limiting the number of potential entrants to N ¡N
¤ is not innocuous. Increasing N ¡N
¤ by increasing
N exacerbates the coordination problem that potential entrants face.
6They discount future payo®s using a discount factor of ¯.
Timing. In each period the sequence of events is as follows:
1. Incumbent ¯rms learn their scrap value and decide on exit and investment. Potential
entrants learn their setup cost and decide on entry and investment.
2. Incumbent ¯rms compete in the product market.
3. Exit and entry decisions are implemented.
4. The investment decisions of the remaining incumbents and new entrants are carried
out and their uncertain outcomes are realized.
Throughout we use ! to denote the state of the industry at the beginning of the period
and !0 to denote its state at the end of the period after the state-to-state transitions are
realized. Firms observe the state at the beginning of the period as well as the outcomes of
the entry, exit, and investment decisions during the period.
While the entry, exit, and investment decisions are made simultaneously, we assume
that an incumbent's investment decision is carried out only if it remains in the industry.
Similarly, we assume that an entrant's investment decision is carried out only if it enters the
industry. Hence, an optimizing incumbent ¯rm will choose its investment at the beginning
of each period under the presumption that it does not exit this period and an optimizing
potential entrant will do so under the presumption that it enters the industry.
Incumbent ¯rms. Suppose !n 6= M + 1 and consider incumbent ¯rm n. We assume
that at the beginning of each period each incumbent ¯rm draws a random scrap value
from a distribution F(¢) with E(Án) = Á.4 Scrap values are independently and identically
distributed across ¯rms and periods. Incumbent ¯rm n learns its scrap value Án prior to
making its exit and investment decisions, but the scrap values of its rivals remain unknown
to it. Let Ân(!;Án) = 1 indicate that the decision of incumbent ¯rm n, who has drawn
scrap value Án, is to remain in the industry in state ! and let Ân(!;Án) = 0 indicate that
its decision is to exit the industry, collect the scrap value Án, and perish. Since this decision
is conditioned on its private Án, it is a random variable from the perspective of other ¯rms.
We use »n(!) =
R
Ân(!;Án)dF(Án) to denote the probability that incumbent ¯rm n remains
in the industry in state !.
This is the ¯rst place where our model diverges from Ericson & Pakes (1995), who
assume that scrap values are constant across ¯rms and periods. As we show in Section
3, deterministic scrap values raise serious existence issues. In the limit, however, as the
distribution of Án becomes degenerate, our model collapses to theirs.
4It is straightforward to allow ¯rm n's scrap value Án to vary systematically with its state !n by replacing
F(¢) by F!n(¢).
7If the incumbent remains in the industry, it competes in the product market. Let ¼n(!)
denote the current pro¯t of incumbent ¯rm n from product market competition in state
!. We stipulate that ¼n(¢) is a reduced-form pro¯t function that fully incorporates the
nature of product market competition in the industry. In addition to receiving a pro¯t, the
incumbent incurs the investment xn(!) 2 [0; ¹ x] that it decided on at the beginning of the
period and moves from state !n to state !0
n 6= M + 1 in accordance with the transition
probabilities speci¯ed below.
Potential entrants. Suppose that !n = M + 1 and consider potential entrant n. We
assume that at the beginning of each period each potential entrant draws a random setup
cost from a distribution Fe(¢) with E(Áe
n) = Áe. Like scrap values, setup costs are inde-
pendently and identically distributed across ¯rms and periods, and its setup cost is private
to a ¯rm. If potential entrant n enters the industry, it incurs the setup cost Áe
n. If it stays
out, it receives nothing and perishes. We use Âe
n(!;Áe
n) = 1 to indicate that the decision of
potential entrant n, who has drawn setup cost Áe
n, is to enter the industry in state ! and
Âe
n(!;Áe







n) denotes the probability that potential entrant n enters
the industry in state !.
Unlike an incumbent, the entrant does not compete in the product market. Instead
it undergoes a setup period upon committing to entry. The entrant incurs its previously
chosen investment xe
n(!) 2 [0; ¹ xe] and moves to state !0
n 6= M +1. Hence, at the end of the
setup period, the entrant becomes an incumbent.
This is the second place where we generalize the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model. Ericson
& Pakes (1995) assume that, unlike exit decisions, entry decisions are made sequentially.
We propose a simultaneous formulation of entry that allows more than one ¯rm per period
to enter the industry in an uncoordinated fashion. We also allow the potential entrant to
make an initial investment in order to improve the odds that it enters the industry in a
more favorable state. This contrasts with Ericson & Pakes (1995) where the entrant is being
randomly assigned to an arbitrary position and thus has no control over its initial position
within the industry.5
Transition probabilities. The probability that the industry transits from today's state
! to tomorrow's state !0 is determined jointly by the investment decisions of the incumbent
¯rms that remain in the industry and the potential entrants that enter the industry. For-
mally the transition probabilities are encoded in the transition function P : S2£f0;1g2N £
[0; ¹ x]N £ [0; ¹ xe]N ! [0;1]. Thus, P (!0;!;Â(!;Á);Âe (!;Áe);x(!);xe (!)) is the probabil-
ity that the industry moves from state ! to state !0 given that the incumbent ¯rms' exit
decision are Â(!;Á) = (Â1 (!;Á1);:::;ÂN (!;ÁN)), their investment decisions are x(!) =
5We nest their formulation by setting ¹ x
e = 0.
8(x1 (!);:::;xN (!)); etc. Necessarily
P
!02S P (!0;!;Â(!;Á);Âe (!;Áe);x(!);xe (!)) = 1.
















where Pn (¢) gives the probability that incumbent ¯rm n transits from state !n to state !0
n
conditional on its exit decision being Ân(!;Án) and its investment decision being xn(!) and
Pe
n(¢) gives the probability that potential entrant n transits to state !0
n. In general, however,
transitions need not be independent across ¯rms. Independence is violated, for example,
in the presence of demand or cost shocks that are common to ¯rms or in the presence of
externalities.
Since a ¯rm's scrap value or setup cost is private information, its exit or entry decision
is a random variable from the perspective of an outside observer. The outside observer
thus has to \integrate out" over all possible realizations of ¯rms' exit and entry decisions


































To see this, recall that scrap values and setup costs are independently distributed across
¯rms. Since, from the point of view of other ¯rms, the probability that incumbent ¯rm n
remains in the industry in state ! is »n(!) =
R
Ân(!;Án)dF(Án), a particular realization ¶ =
(¶1;:::;¶N) of incumbent ¯rms' exit decisions occurs with probability
Q
n=1;:::;N »n(!)¶n(1¡
»n(!))1¡¶n. Similarly, a particular realization ¶e = (¶e
1;:::;¶e
N) of potential entrants' entry






n. Equation (1) results
from observing that if !n 6= M +1 (!n = M +1), then ¯rm n is an incumbent (entrant) and
conditioning on all possible realizations of incumbent ¯rms' exit decisions ¶ and potential
entrants' entry decisions ¶e.
The crucial implication of equation (1) is that the probability of a transition from state
! to state !0 hinges on the exit and entry probabilities »(!) and »e(!). Thus, when forming
an expectation over the industry's future state, a ¯rm does not need to know the entire exit
and entry rules Â¡n(!;¢) and Âe
¡n(!;¢) of its rivals; rather it su±ces to know their exit and
entry probabilities.
9An incumbent's problem. Suppose that the industry is in state ! with !n 6= M +
1. Incumbent ¯rm n solves an intertemporal maximization problem to reach its exit and
investment decisions. Let Vn(!;Án) denote the expected net present value of all future cash
°ows to incumbent ¯rm n, computed under the presumption that ¯rms behave optimally,
when the industry is in state ! and the ¯rm has drawn scrap value Án. It is de¯ned








n 6= M + 1; ~ xn(!;Án);»¡n(!);»e(!);x¡n(!);xe(!)g
o
; (2)
where, with an overloading of notation, Vn(!) =
R
Vn(!;Án)dF(Án) is the expected value
function. The RHS of the Bellman equation is composed of the incumbent's pro¯t from
product market competition ¼n(!) and, depending on the exit decision ~ Ân(!;Án), either the
return to exiting, Án, or the return to remaining in the industry. The latter is given by the
term inside brackets and is in turn composed of two parts: the investment ~ xn(!;Án) and
the net present value of the incumbent's future cash °ows, ¯EfVn(!0)j¢g. Several remarks
are in order. First, since scrap values are independent across periods, the ¯rm's future
returns are described by its expected value function Vn (!0). Second, recall that !0 denotes
the state at the end of the current period after the state-to-state transitions have been
realized. The expectation operator re°ects the fact that !0 is unknown at the beginning of
the current period when the decisions are made. The incumbent conditions its expectations
on the decisions of the other incumbents, »¡n(!) and x¡n(!), a well as on the decisions
of all potential entrants, »e(!) and xe(!). It also conditions its expectations on its own
investment choice and presumes that it remains in the industry in state !, i.e., it conditions
on !0
n 6= M + 1. Note that with the recursive formulation of the incumbent's problem in
equation (2) there is no need to condition on ¯rms' entire strategies.
Since investment is chosen conditional on remaining in the industry, the problem of
incumbent ¯rm n can be broken up into two parts. First, the incumbent chooses its invest-
ment. The optimal investment choice is independent of the ¯rm's scrap value, and there
is thus no need to index xn(!) by Án. This also justi¯es making the expectation operator
conditional on x¡n(!) (as opposed to scrap-value speci¯c investment decisions). Second,
given its investment choice, the incumbent decides whether or not to remain in the industry.
The incumbent's exit decision clearly depends on its scrap value, just as its rivals' exit and
entry decisions depend on their scrap values and setup costs. Nevertheless, it is enough to
condition on »¡n(!) and »e(!) in light of equation (1).




1 if Án · ¹ Án(!);
0 if Án ¸ ¹ Án(!);
where
¹ Án(!) = sup
~ xn(!)2[0;¹ x]
¡~ xn(!)+¯EfVn(!0)j!;!0
n 6= M +1; ~ xn(!);»¡n(!);»e(!);x¡n(!);xe(!)g
(3)
denotes the cuto® scrap value for which the incumbent is indi®erent between remaining
in the industry and exiting. Hence, the solution to the incumbent's decision problem has
the reservation property. Moreover, provided that the distribution of scrap values F(¢)
has a continuous and positive density, incumbent ¯rm n has a unique optimal exit choice
for all scrap values (except for a set of measure zero). Without loss of generality, we can
therefore restrict attention to decision rules of the form 1[Án < ¹ Án(!)], where 1[¢] denotes
the indicator function. These decision rules can be represented in two ways:
1. with the cuto® scrap value ¹ Án(!) itself; or
2. with the probability »n(!) of incumbent ¯rm n remaining in the industry in state !.




1[Án < ¹ Án(!)]dF(Án) =
F(¹ Án(!)) is equivalent to F¡1(»n(!)) = ¹ Án(!).6 The second representation proves to be
more useful and we use it below almost exclusively.
Next we turn to payo®s. Imposing the reservation property and integrating over Án on
















¼n(!) + (1 ¡ ~ »n(!))Á +
Z
Án>F¡1(~ »n(!))









Án>F¡1(~ »n(!))(Án ¡ Á)dF(Án) re°ects our assumption that the scrap value is
random. It vanishes in a game of complete information such as Ericson & Pakes (1995),
where scrap values are constant across ¯rms and periods.
An entrant's problem. Suppose that the industry is in state ! with !n = M + 1. The
expected net present value of all future cash °ows to potential entrant n when the industry
6If the support of F(¢) is is bounded, we de¯ne F
¡1(0) (F
¡1(1)) to be the in¯mum (supremum) of the
support.



























Unlike the incumbent's value function, the entrant's value function is not de¯ned recur-
sively. Instead, it can be easily calculated given the incumbent's value function because the
entrant is short-lived and does not solve an intertemporal maximization problem to reach
its decisions.7 Depending on the entry decision Âe
n(!;Áe), the RHS of the above equation is
either 0 or the expected return to entering the industry, which is in turn composed of two
parts. First, the entrant pays the setup cost and sinks its investment, yielding a current
cash °ow of ¡Áe
n ¡ ~ xe
n(!;Áe
n). Second, the entrant takes the net present value of its future
cash °ows into account. Since potential entrant n becomes incumbent ¯rm n at the end
of the setup period, this is given by ¯EfVn(!0)j¢g. The entrant conditions its expectations
on the decisions of all incumbents, »(!) and x(!) as well as on the decisions of the other
entrants, »e
¡n(!) and xe
¡n(!). It also conditions its expectations on its own investment
choice and presumes that it enters the industry in state !, i.e., it conditions on !0
n 6= M +1.
Similar to the incumbent's problem, the entrant's problem can be broken up into two
parts. Since investment is chosen conditional on entering the industry, the optimal invest-
ment choice xe
n(!) is independent of the ¯rm's setup cost Áe
n. Given its investment choice,







n · ¹ Áe
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denotes the cuto® setup cost. As with incumbents, the solution to the entrant's decision
problem has the reservation property and we can restrict attention to decision rules of the
form 1[Áe
n < ¹ Áe
n(!)]. The set of all such rules can be indexed by the cuto® setup cost ¹ Áe
n(!)
or by the corresponding probability »e
n(!) of potential entrant n entering the industry in
state !. Imposing the reservation property and integrating over Áe
n on both sides of equation









































n) + ~ »e
n(!)
n
¡ Áe ¡ ~ xe
n(!)
+¯EfVn(!0)j!;!0



















n) is again not present in a setting with complete information.
Notation. To save on notation, we identify the nth incumbent ¯rm with ¯rm n in states
!n 6= M +1 and the nth potential entrant with ¯rm n in state !n = M +1 in what follows.
That is, we de¯ne
V e
n(!1;:::;!n¡1;!n;!n+1;:::;!N) = Vn(!1;:::;!n¡1;M + 1;!n+1;:::;!N);
»e
n(!1;:::;!n¡1;!n;!n+1;:::;!N) = »n(!1;:::;!n¡1;M + 1;!n+1;:::;!N);
xe
n(!1;:::;!n¡1;!n;!n+1;:::;!N) = xn(!1;:::;!n¡1;M + 1;!n+1;:::;!N):
Let S = ­N = f!1;:::;!jSjg. De¯ne the jSj £ N matrix V by











and the jSj £ (N ¡ 1) matrix V¡n by V¡n = (V1;:::;Vn¡1;Vn+1;:::;VN). Vn represents
the value function of ¯rm n or, more precisely, the value function of incumbent ¯rm n if
!n 6= M + 1 and the value function of potential entrant n if !n = M + 1. De¯ne V (!) =
(V1(!);:::;VN(!)) and V¡n(!) = (V1(!);:::;Vn¡1(!);Vn+1(!);:::;VN(!)). De¯ne the
jSj £ N matrices » and x similarly. Finally, de¯ne the jSj £ 2N matrix u by u = (»;x). In
what follows we use the terms matrix and function interchangeably.
Actions, strategies, and payo®s. An action or decision for ¯rm n in state ! speci¯es
either the probability that the incumbent remains in the industry or the probability that




[0;1] £ [0; ¹ x] if !n 6= M + 1;
[0;1] £ [0; ¹ xe] if !n = M + 1:
(8)
denotes ¯rm n's feasible actions in state !. A strategy or policy for ¯rm n speci¯es an action
un(!) 2 Un(!) for each state !. Such a strategy is called Markovian because it is restricted
to be a function of the current state rather than the entire history of the game. De¯ne
Un = £!2SUn(!) to be the strategy space of ¯rm n and U = £N
n=1Un to be the strategy
13space of the entire industry. By construction Un(!) and hence Un and U are nonempty,
convex, and compact assuming that ¹ x < 1 and ¹ xe < 1.
Using the above notation, the Bellman equations (4) and (7) of incumbent ¯rm n and
potential entrant n, respectively, can more compactly be stated as
Vn(!) = sup
~ un2Un(!)





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
¼n(!) + (1 ¡ »n(!))Á +
R
Án>F¡1(»n(!))(Án ¡ Á)dF (Án)
+»n(!)
n
¡ xn(!) + ¯EfVn(!0)j!;!0
n 6= M + 1;»¡n(!);x(!)g
o









¡ Áe ¡ xn(!) + ¯EfVn(!0)j!;!0
n 6= M + 1;»¡n(!);x(!)g
o
if !n = M + 1:
hn(¢) is called ¯rm n's return (Denardo 1967, p. 166) or local income function (Whitt 1980,
p. 35). The number hn(!;u(!);Vn) represents the return to ¯rm n in state ! when the
¯rms use actions u(!) and ¯rm n's future returns are described by the value function Vn.
Equilibrium. Our solution concept is that of Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). An
equilibrium involves value and policy functions V and u such that (i) given u¡n, Vn solves the
Bellman equation (9) for all n and (ii) given u¡n(!) and Vn, un(!) solves the maximization
problem on the RHS of this equation for all ! and all n. A ¯rm thus behaves optimally in
every state, irrespective of whether this state is on or o® the equilibrium path. Moreover,
since the horizon is in¯nite and the in°uence of past play is captured in the current state,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between subgames and states. Hence, any MPE is
subgame perfect. Note that since a best reply to Markovian strategies u¡n is a Markovian
strategy un, a MPE remains a subgame perfect equilibrium even if more general strategies
are considered.
3 An Introductory Example
In this section, we ¯rst give an example in which a symmetric equilibrium in pure entry/exit
strategies fails to exist in a setting with complete information such as Ericson & Pakes
(1995).8 We then demonstrate that incorporating ¯rm heterogeneity in the form of random
scrap values/setup costs into the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model restores existence. We close
this section with a brief discussion of computational issues.
We set N = 2 and M = 1. This implies that the industry is either a monopoly (states
8We defer a formal de¯nition of our symmetry notion to Section 4.2.
14(1;2) and (2;1)) or a duopoly (state (1;1)). Moreover, since there is just one \active" state,
there is no incentive to invest, so we set xn(!) = 0 for all ! and all n in what follows. To
simplify things further, we assume that entry is prohibitively costly and focus entirely on
exit.9 Let ¼(!1;!2) denote ¯rm 1's current pro¯t in state ! = (!1;!2). Symmetry implies








Hence, while a monopoly is viable, a duopoly is not. This gives rise to a \war of attrition."
Example: Deterministic scrap values/setup costs. The sole decision that a ¯rm
must make is whether or not to exit the industry. Consider ¯rm 1. Given ¯rm 2's exit
decision Â(1;1) 2 f0;1g, its value function is de¯ned by the Bellman equation
V (1;2) = sup
~ Â(1;2)2f0;1g
¼(1;2) + (1 ¡ ~ Â(1;2))Á + ~ Â(1;2)¯V (1;2);
V (1;1) = sup
~ Â(1;1)2f0;1g
¼(1;1) + (1 ¡ ~ Â(1;1))Á + ~ Â(1;1)¯
n
Â(1;1)V (1;1) + (1 ¡ Â(1;1))V (1;2)
o
:
Recall that ~ Â(!) = 1 indicates that ¯rm 1 remains in the industry in state ! and ~ Â(!) = 0
that it exits. The optimal exit decisions ~ Â(1;2) and ~ Â(1;1) of ¯rm 1 satisfy
~ Â(!) =
(
1 if Á · ¹ Á(!);
0 if Á ¸ ¹ Á(!);
where
¹ Á(1;2) = ¯V (1;2); (11)
¹ Á(1;1) = ¯
n
Â(1;1)V (1;1) + (1 ¡ Â(1;1))V (1;2)
o
: (12)
Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium we must have ~ Â(!1;!2) = Â(!2;!1).
To show that there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure exit strategies, we show that
(Â(1;2);Â(1;1)) 2 f(0;0);(0;1);(1;0);(1;1)g leads to a contradiction. Working through
these cases, suppose ¯rst that Â(1;2) = 0. Then V (1;2) = ¼(1;2) + Á and the assumed
optimality of Â(1;2) = 0 implies




This contradicts assumption (10); therefore no equilibrium with Â(1;2) = 0 exists. Next
consider Â(1;1) = 1. Then V (1;1) =
¼(1;1)
1¡¯ and the assumed optimality of Â(1;1) = 1
9A similar example can be constructed to demonstrate that there may not exist a symmetric equilibrium
in pure entry strategies.
15implies




This contradicts assumption (10); therefore no equilibrium with Â(1;1) = 1 exists. This
leaves us with one more possibility: Â(1;2) = 1 and Â(1;1) = 0. Here V (1;2) =
¼(1;2)
1¡¯ and
the assumed optimality of Â(1;2) = 1 implies




which again contradicts assumption (10). Hence, there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium
in pure exit strategies.
Although there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure exit strategies there is one in mixed




; V (1;1) = ¼(1;1) + Á;
»(1;2) = 1; »(1;1) =
(1 ¡ ¯)Á ¡ ¯¼(1;2)
¯ ((1 ¡ ¯)(¼(1;1) + Á) ¡ ¼(1;2))
:
Example: Random scrap values/setup costs. Pakes & McGuire (1994) suggest the
use of random setup costs to overcome convergence problems in their algorithm. Conver-
gence problems may be indicative of nonexistence in pure entry/exit strategies. In the
example above, an algorithm that seeks a (nonexistent) symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies tends to cycle between prescribing that neither ¯rm should exit from a monopo-
listic industry and prescribing that both ¯rms should exit from a duopolistic one.
To restore existence we introduced in Section 2 random scrap values in addition to the
random setup costs suggested by Pakes & McGuire (1994).10 We now modify the above
example to illustrate the use of incomplete information. Speci¯cally, we assume that scrap
values are independently and identically distributed across ¯rms and periods, and that its
scrap value is private to a ¯rm. We write ¯rm 1's scrap value as Á + ²µ, where ² > 0 is a
constant scale factor that measures the importance of incomplete information. Overloading
notation, we assume that µ » F(¢) with E(µ) = 0. The Bellman equation of ¯rm 1 is
V (1;2) = sup
~ »(1;2)2[0;1]
¼(1;2) + (1 ¡ ~ »(1;2))Á + ²
Z
µ>F¡1(~ »(1;2))
µdF(µ) + ~ »(1;2)¯V (1;2);
V (1;1) = sup
~ »(1;1)2[0;1]






»(1;1)V (1;1) + (1 ¡ »(1;1))V (1;2)
o
;
10Pakes & McGuire (1994) also suggest imposing an exogenous order on exit decisions as a means for
addressing convergence problems (p. 570). Our formulation treats entry and exit on an equal footing, i.e.,
we introduce randomness into both decisions as suggested by Gowrisankaran (1995).
16parameter ¼(1;1) ¼(1;2) Á ¯
value 0 1 15 1
1:05
Table 1: Parameter values.
² V (!1;!1) V (!1;!2) »(!1;!1) »(!1;!2)
10 21.15967144 23.81754397 0.784835743 0.884168761
5 18.04492189 21 0.780374511 1
1 15.7308879 21 0.854919822 1
0.1 15.07621885 21 0.873034083 1
0.01 15.00765282 21 0.874803972 1
0.001 15.00076559 21 0.874980403 1
10¡6 15.00000077 21 0.87499998 1
Table 2: Equilibrium with random scrap values.
where »(1;1) 2 [0;1] is ¯rm 2's exit decision. The optimal exit decisions of ¯rm 1, ~ »(1;2)




where ¹ Á(!) is as in equations (11) and
(12) except that Â(!) is replaced by »(!).11 Moreover, in a symmetric equilibrium we must
have ~ »(!1;!2) = »(!2;!1). This yields a system of four equations in four unknowns V (1;2),
V (1;1), »(1;2), and »(1;1).
Obtaining analytic solutions is complicated by the fact that the equations that de¯ne
the value function are no longer linear in V (!) because V (!) enters ¹ Á(!). For analytic







0 if F¡1(»(!)) · ¡1;
1¡F¡1(»(!))2
4 if ¡1 < F¡1(»(!)) < 1;
0 if F¡1(»(!)) ¸ 1;
where F¡1(»(!)) = 2»(!)¡1: There are nine cases to be considered, depending on whether
»(1;1) is equal to 0, between 0 and 1, or equal to 1 and on whether »(1;2) is equal to 0,
between 0 and 1, or equal to 1. Table 1 speci¯es parameters values.
A case-by-case analysis shows that, with random scrap values, there always exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium. If ² > 5, the equilibrium involves 0 < »(1;1) < 1 and
0 < »(1;2) < 1, and if ² · 5, it involves 0 < »(1;1) < 1 and »(1;2) = 1. Table 2
describes the equilibrium for various values of ². Given the parameter values in Table
1, the symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies of the game of complete information is
V (1;2) = 21, V (1;1) = 15, »(1;2) = 1, and »(1;1) = 7
8 = 0:875. As Table 2 shows, the
equilibrium with random scrap values converges to the equilibrium in mixed strategies as ²
approaches zero. In the next section, we show that existence and convergence are general
11To see this, note that the ¯rst and second derivatives of the RHS of the Bellman equation are given by
d(:)
d~ »(!) = ¡Á ¡ ²F
¡1(~ »(!)) + ¹ Á(!) and
d2(:)
d~ »(!)2 = ¡²
1
F0(F¡1(~ »(!))), respectively.
17properties of the game of incomplete information.
Computational issues. The advantage of studying a game of incomplete information is
that it eliminates the need for mixed entry/exit strategies without jeopardizing existence.
In comparison to the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model the Bellman equation now has one
additional term re°ecting how random scrap values/setup costs a®ect a ¯rm's per-period
payo®. But, as demonstrated in the above example, an appropriate distribution of the
scrap values/setup costs yields a closed-form expression for this term. Similarly, the cuto®
scrap value/setup cost that determines the probability an incumbent ¯rm remains in the
industry/a potential entrant enters the industry is easily calculated. Thus introducing
incomplete information into the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model adds essentially nothing to
the computational burden.
In fact, the equilibrium of the game of incomplete information can be computed using
a slightly modi¯ed version of the algorithm that Pakes & McGuire (1994) developed. This
algorithm works iteratively. In the lth iteration, it takes a value function V l and a policy
function »l as its input and outputs updated value and policy functions V l+1 and »l+1. In
the context of the above example each iteration proceeds as follows: First, update the policy
function by assigning »l+1(!) Ã F(
¹ Á(!)¡Á
² ), where
¹ Á(1;2) = ¯V l(1;2); (13)
¹ Á(1;1) = ¯
n
»l(1;1)V l(1;1) + (1 ¡ »l(1;1))V l(1;2)
o
: (14)
Second, update the value function by assigning
V l+1(!) Ã ¼(!) + (1 ¡ »l+1(!))Á + ²
Z
µ>F¡1(»l+1(!))
µdF(µ) + »l+1(!)¹ Á(!);
where ¹ Á(!) is as in equations (13) and (14) except that »l(!) is replaced by »l+1(!). The
algorithm terminates once the relative change in the value and the policy functions from
one iteration to the next is below a pre-speci¯ed tolerance. We take this tolerance to be
10¡8 and use V 0 = 0 and »0 = 0 as starting values.
In the column labelled ¸ = 1 Table 3 lists the number of iterations until convergence.
The algorithm converges quickly if ² is large but fails to converge otherwise (indicated by
a blank). It turns out that adding a dampening scheme (see e.g. Chapter 3 of Judd 1998)
aids convergence. The dampening scheme combines the updated and the current policy




+ (1 ¡ ¸)»l(!) where ¸ 2 (0;1). The
remaining columns of Table 3 list the number of iterations until convergence for di®erent
values of ¸ 2 (0;1). There is a clear trade-o® between convergence and speed. Roughly
speaking, we are able to decrease ² by an order of magnitude if we are willing to do the
same with ¸. This results in a tenfold increase in the number of iterations.
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion depends on the modeler's objective.
18² ¸ = 1 ¸ = 0:1 ¸ = 0:01 ¸ = 0:001 ¸ = 0:0001
10 87 457 3620 28416 207741
5 251 1256 9294 67105 421664
1 325 1610 13641 113229
0.1 1555 13092 107742
0.01 13092 107742
0.001 107742
Table 3: Number of iterations until convergence.
If it is to calculate an equilibrium in mixed entry/exit strategies of the game of complete
information, then the game of incomplete information may be a feasible way to obtain
an approximation to such an equilibrium. The original algorithm must fail in the case in
which only an equilibrium in (nondegenerate) mixed strategies exists, for that algorithm can
neither exactly compute such an equilibrium nor can it closely approximate it. Slow con-
vergence may therefore be the price payed to compute an approximation to an equilibrium
in mixed strategies. If, on the other hand, random scrap values/setup costs are thought to
be an accurate description of industry fundamentals, then the modi¯ed algorithm can be
applied to compute an equilibrium in cuto® entry/exit strategies. In sharp contrast to the
game of complete information, the search for an equilibrium is never in vain because an
equilibrium in cuto® entry/exit strategies is guaranteed to exist. The next section formally
establishes this claim.
4 Existence and Convergence
In this section, we show how incorporating ¯rm heterogeneity in the form of random scrap
values/setup costs into the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment strategies. We ¯rst establish the
existence of a possibly asymmetric and nonanonymous equilibrium. The proof extends
Whitt (1980) to a setting with incomplete information. In fact, for the most part, it is
a reassembly of his argument and some general results on dynamic programming due to
Denardo (1967). Both papers use models that are su±ciently abstract to enable us to
construct the bulk of the existence proof by citing their intermediate results. We then build
on our basic existence result in several ways. We ¯rst show that a symmetric and anonymous
equilibrium exists. This is essential from a computational viewpoint because symmetry and
anonymity substantially reduce the computational burden. Second, we show that, as the
distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes degenerate, equilibria in cuto®
entry/exit strategies converge to equilibria in mixed entry/exit strategies of the game of
complete information. Third, as a by-product, this last result implies that there exists an
equilibrium in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model provided that mixed entry/exit strategies
19are admissible.
4.1 Existence
We begin by stating and discussing a series of assumptions. Our ¯rst assumption ensures
that the model's primitives are bounded.
Assumption 1 (i) The state space is ¯nite, i.e., N < 1 and M < 1. (ii) Pro¯ts are
bounded, i.e., there exists ¹ ¼ < 1 such that ¡¹ ¼ < ¼n(!) < ¹ ¼ for all ! and all n. (iii)
Investments are bounded, i.e., ¹ x < 1 and ¹ xe < 1. (iv) The distributions of scrap values
F(¢) and setup costs Fe(¢) have continuous and positive densities and bounded supports,
i.e., there exist ¹ Á < 1 and ¹ Áe < 1 such that the supports of F(¢) and Fe(¢) are contained
in the interval [¡¹ Á; ¹ Á] and [¡¹ Áe; ¹ Áe], respectively. (v) Firms discount future payo®s, i.e.,
¯ 2 [0;1).
Next we assume continuity of ¯rm n's local income function hn(¢). Similar continuity
assumptions are commonplace in the literature on dynamic stochastic games (see Mertens
2002).
Assumption 2 hn(!;u(!);Vn) is a continuous function of u(!) and Vn for all ! and all
n.
Note that hn(¢) is always continuous in Vn as long as Vn enters hn(¢) via the expected value
of ¯rm n's future cash °ows, EfVn(!0)j¢g. Moreover, given that in our model formulation
current pro¯t is additively separable from investment, continuity of hn(¢) merely requires
continuity of the transition function P (¢). We make the continuity assumption on hn(¢)
rather than on P (¢) to facilitate the adaptation of our existence proof to other models in
which current pro¯t is not additively separable from investment.12
Due to the random scrap values/setup costs, our model is formally a dynamic stochastic
game with a ¯nite state space and a continuum of actions given by the probability that
an incumbent ¯rm remains in the industry/a potential entrant enters the industry and
the set of feasible investment choices. Under assumptions 1 and 2, standard arguments
(e.g., Federgruen 1978) yield the existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. However,
computing mixed strategies over continuous actions is not practical. To guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment strategies, we make the
additional assumption that ¯rm n's investment problem always has a unique solution.
Assumption 3 A unique xn(!) exists that attains the maximum of hn(!;1;xn(!);u¡n(!);Vn)
for all u¡n(!), Vn, !, and all n.
12In models of learning-by-doing (Cabral & Riordan 1994, Benkard 2003), for example, ¯rms' price or
quantity decisions today determine their current pro¯t as well as their marginal cost of production tomorrow.
Hence, the current pro¯t of incumbent ¯rm n is ¼n(!;x(!)), where x(!) = (x1(!);:::;xN(!)) denotes the
prices charged or the quantities marketed.
20In Section 5 we de¯ne UIC admissibility of the transition function P (¢) and prove that
this condition on the model's primitives ensures uniqueness of investment choice and, thus,
existence of an equilibrium that is amenable to computation.
Recall that we assume that entry and exit decisions are implemented before investment
decisions are carried out. Hence, ¯rm n chooses xn(!) in order to maximize hn(!;1;xn(!);u¡n(!);Vn)
(see equations (3) and (6)), and the resulting investment choice also maximizes hn(!;»n(!);xn(!);u¡n(!);Vn)
for all »n(!) > 0, u¡n(!), Vn, !, and all n. Clearly any investment would be optimal when-
ever an incumbent ¯rm exits for sure or a potential entrant stays out for sure. We thus
adopt the following convention: if »n(!) = 0, then we take xn(!) to have the value alluded
to in assumption 3. It follows that hn(!;»n(!);xn(!);u¡n(!);Vn) attains its maximum for
a unique value of xn(!) independent of the value of »n(!). This is a natural convention
because if there were even the slightest chance that ¯rm n would remain in the industry
although it sets »n(!) = 0, then the ¯rm would want to choose this value of xn(!) as its
investment.
The above assumptions ensure existence of a computationally tractable equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 3, an equilibrium exists in cuto® entry/exit
and pure investment strategies.
The proof is based on the following idea. Fix strategies u¡n and consider ¯rm n's
problem. Since its competitors' strategies are ¯xed, ¯rm n has to solve a decision problem
(as opposed to a game problem). We can thus employ dynamic programming techniques to
analyze the ¯rm's problem. In particular, a contraction mapping argument establishes that
the ¯rm's best reply to its competitors' strategies is well-de¯ned. It remains to show that
there exists a ¯xed point in the ¯rms' best-reply correspondences. From a computational
point of view, the proof mimics an algorithm that nests a dynamic programming problem
within a ¯xed point problem.13
Before stating the proof of proposition 1, we introduce and discuss a number of con-
structs that will also be useful in later parts of the paper. We start with the decision
problem. Let Vn denote the space of bounded jSj £ 1 vectors with the sup norm and let ½
denote the corresponding metric. Fix u¡n 2 U¡n and de¯ne the maximal return operator
H¤






u¡nVn)(!) represents the return to ¯rm n in state ! when ¯rm n chooses
its optimal action while the other ¯rms use actions u¡n(!) and ¯rm n's future returns are
described by Vn. Note that the RHS of the above equation coincides with the RHS of the
Bellman equation (9).
13Such an algorithm has indeed been suggested by Rust (1994).
21Since pro¯ts, investments, scrap values, and setup costs are bounded by assumption 1,
H¤
n;u¡n takes bounded vectors into bounded vectors. Application of Blackwell's su±cient
conditions (monotonicity and discounting, see e.g. p. 54 of Stokey & Lucas (1989)) shows
that H¤
n;u¡n is a contraction with modulus ¯. The contraction mapping theorem (Stokey
& Lucas 1989, p. 50) therefore implies that there exists a unique V ¤








hn(!; ~ un(!);u¡n(!);V ¤
n;u¡n) (15)
for all !. The ¯xed point V ¤
n;u¡n of H¤
n;u¡n is called the maximal return function given
policies u¡n; it should be thought of as a mapping from U¡n into Vn. Clearly, given u¡n,
the maximal return function V ¤
n;u¡n solves the Bellman equation (9), and thus plays a major
role in our existence proof.
Before proceeding to the existence proof, we introduce and discuss another operator.
Fix u 2 U and de¯ne the return operator Hn;u : Vn ! Vn pointwise by
(Hn;uVn)(!) = hn(!;u(!);Vn):
The number (HuVn)(!) represents the return to ¯rm n in state ! when the ¯rms use actions
u(!) and ¯rm n's future returns are described by Vn. Like H¤
n;u¡n, Hn;u is a contraction
with modulus ¯ that takes bounded vectors into bounded vectors. Hence, there exists a
unique Vn;u 2 Vn that satis¯es Vn;u = Hn;uVn;u, i.e.,
Vn;u(!) = hn(!;u(!);Vn;u) (16)
for all !. The ¯xed point Vn;u of Hn;u is called the return function given policies un; it
should be thought of as a mapping from U into Vn.
Note that there is a tight connection between the return function Vn;u and the maximal
return function V ¤
n;u¡n. In fact, because the return operator Hn;u is monotonic, theorem 3





for all !, where Vn;~ un;u¡n is the ¯xed point of the return operator given policy (~ un;u¡n).
Put loosely, choosing one's optimal response state by state yields the same return as choos-
ing ones optimal response jointly for all states. Somewhat more formally, the solution
to the Bellman equation (9) coincides with the solution to the (considerably more cum-
bersome) sequence form of the decision problem. To bring out the implications of equa-
tion (17), ¯x strategies u¡n and consider a family of games where each member of the
family is indexed by the initial state !. Firm n's best reply to u¡n for the game begin-
22ning in state ! yields a payo® of sup~ un2Un Vn;~ un;u¡n(!). But the maximal return func-
tion V ¤
n;u¡n is independent of the initial state and so is the strategy de¯ned pointwise by
argsup~ un(!)2Un(!) hn(!; ~ un(!);u¡n(!);V ¤
n;u¡n). Hence, the best reply can always be taken
to be independent of the initial state, a fact which we shall use presently.
With this machinery in place, we turn to the game problem. Consider the mapping
¨ : U ! U de¯ned pointwise by
¨n(u) =
(
~ un 2 Un : ~ un(!) 2 arg sup
~ un(!)2Un(!)
hn(!; ~ un(!);u¡n(!);V ¤
n;u¡n) for all !
)
: (18)
Note that ¨n(¢) is the best-reply correspondence of ¯rm n. An equilibrium exists if there
is a u 2 U such that u 2 ¨(u). To show that such a u exists, we show that ¨(¢) is, in fact,
a continuous function to which Brouwer's ¯xed point theorem applies.
Proof of Proposition 1. We begin by establishing that ¨(¢) is non-empty and
upper hemi-continuous. Given policies u¡n, ¯rm n's maximal return function V ¤
n;u¡n is
well-de¯ned due to assumption 1 as shown above. Fix !. Assumption 2 states that ¯rm
n's local income function hn(!;u(!);Vn) is continuous in u(!) and Vn: The maximand,
hn(!;un(!);u¡n(!);V ¤
n;u¡n), in the de¯nition of ¨n (¢) is therefore continuous in un(!) and
u¡n if ¯rm n's maximal return function V ¤
n;u¡n is continuous in u¡n. That this is so is
established through appeal to two lemmas by Whitt (1980).
His lemma 3.2 states that if Hn;uVn is continuous in u for all Vn, then the return function
Vn;u is continuous in u.14 This establishes that Vn;u is a continuous function of u. His lemma
3.1 states that if Un (!), ¯rm n's set of feasible actions in state !, is a compact metric space
for all !, if the state space S is countable, and if the return function Vn;u is continuous in u,
then sup~ un2Un Vn;~ un;u¡n (!) is continuous in u¡n for all !. These requirements are satis¯ed.
Equation (17) thus implies that V ¤
n;u¡n (!) is continuous in u¡n for all !. This, of course,
implies that ¯rm n's maximal return function V ¤
n;u¡n is continuous in u¡n.
Since hn(!;un(!);u¡n(!);V ¤
n;u¡n) is continuous in un(!) and u¡n and Un(!) is com-
pact and independent of u¡n, the theorem of the maximum (see e.g. p. 62 of Stokey &
Lucas 1989) implies that argsup~ un(!)2Un(!) hn(!; ~ un(!);u¡n(!);V ¤
n;u¡n) is non-empty and
upper hemi-continuous in u¡n. Since ! was arbitrary, this establishes that ¨n(¢) is a
non-empty and upper hemi-continuous correspondence that maps U¡n into Un. Hence,
¨(¢) = (¨1(¢);:::;¨N(¢)) is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous.
We next show that ¨(¢) is single-valued. Fix !. Recall that, given policies u¡n, ¯rm n's
maximal return function V ¤
n;u¡n is well-de¯ned and consider ¯rm n's best reply. Uniqueness
of the investment choice follows from assumption 3 and our convention covering the special
case of »n(!) = 0. This, in turn, implies that equations (3) and (6) give unique exit and
entry cuto®s, ¹ Án(!) and ¹ Áe
n(!). Given that these cuto®s are unique, the corresponding exit
and entry probabilities, »n(!) = F(¹ Án(!)) and »e
n(!) = Fe(¹ Áe
n(!)), must be unique. Since
14We set Wn = Vn to obtain a special case of Whitt's (1980) lemma.
23! was arbitrary, this establishes that ¨n(¢) and hence ¨(¢) is single-valued.
Since ¨(¢) is non-empty, single-valued, and upper hemi-continuous, it is, in fact, a con-
tinuous function that maps the non-empty, convex, and compact set U into itself. Brouwer's
¯xed point theorem therefore applies: there exists a u 2 U such that u 2 ¨(u).
Assumption 3 is somewhat stronger than what is actually needed in the proof of propo-
sition 1. Recall from equation (18) that ¨n(¢) depends on V ¤
n;u¡n, i.e., ¯rm n chooses its
best reply given that its future returns are described by the maximal return function. To
ensure the existence of an equilibrium in pure investment strategies it therefore su±ces that
the local income function hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) is maximized at a unique investment choice
xn(!) for all possible maximal return functions V ¤
n;u¡n rather than for all possible value
functions Vn. Hence, if V
¤ and V ¤ denote respectively a loose upper and a loose lower
bound on the maximal return function V ¤
n;u¡n, then assumption 3 can be weakened:
Assumption 4 A unique xn(!) exists that attains the maximum of hn(!;1;xn(!);u¡n(!);Vn)
for all u¡n(!), Vn 2 [V ¤;V
¤]jSj, !, and all n.
The bounds V
¤ and V ¤ are readily derived from the bounds ¹ Á, ¹ Áe, and ¹ ¼ on the fundamentals
F(¢), Fe(¢), and ¼n(¢), respectively. The best possible net present value of the current and
future cash °ow that any ¯rm, be it an incumbent or an entrant, can realize is no greater
than
V
¤ = ¹ Áe +
¹ ¼
1 ¡ ¯
+ ¹ Á; (19)
which is the sum of (i) a bound on its entry subsidy (i.e., negative setup cost), (ii) the
capitalized value of remaining in the best possible state forever, and (iii) a bound on its
scrap value. Because a ¯rm always has the option of investing zero, it can guarantee that
the net present value of its current and future cash °ow is no worse than
V ¤ = ¡¹ Áe ¡
¹ ¼
1 ¡ ¯
¡ ¹ Á; (20)
which is the sum of (i) a bound on its setup cost, (ii) the capitalized value of remaining in
the worst possible state forever, and (iii) a bound on its exit tax (i.e., negative scrap value).
Replacing assumption 3 by assumption 4, we immediately obtain
Corollary 1 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 4, an equilibrium exists in cuto® entry/exit and
pure investment strategies.
We use assumption 4 in the remainder of the paper. It turns out to be especially helpful
in proving that UIC admissibility of the transition function P(¢) guarantees existence of a
computationally tractable equilibrium.
244.2 Symmetry and Anonymity
In Section 4.1 we established the existence of a possibly asymmetric and nonanonymous
equilibrium. We now show that if an additional symmetry and anonymity assumption
is satis¯ed, then a symmetric and anonymous equilibrium exists. In a symmetric equi-
librium, if V1(!1;:::;!N) denotes ¯rm 1's value function, then ¯rm n's value function
is given by Vn(!1;:::;!n¡1;!n;!n+1;:::;!N) = V1(!n;:::;!n¡1;!1;!n+1;:::;!N), and
similarly for the policy function. Symmetry allows us to focus on the problem of ¯rm
1. This problem can be further simpli¯ed by invoking exchangeability or anonymity.
Anonymity says that ¯rm 1 does not care about the identity of its competitors. Hence,
V1(!1;!2;:::;!k;:::;!l;:::;!N) = V1(!1;!2;:::;!l;:::;!k;:::;!N) for all k ¸ 2 and
l ¸ 2, and similarly for the policy function. This, in e®ect, considerably reduces the size of
the state space.
We begin by formalizing our symmetry and anonymity assumption.
Assumption 5 The local income functions are symmetric and exchangeable, i.e.,
hn(!1;:::;!n¡1;!n;!n+1;:::;!N;u1(!);:::;un¡1(!);un(!);un+1(!);:::;uN(!);Vn)
= h1(!n;:::;!n¡1;!1;!n+1;:::;!N;un(!);:::;un¡1(!);u1(!);un+1(!);:::;uN(!);V1)
for all symmetric value functions and all n, and
h1(!1;!2;:::;!k;:::;!l;:::;!N;u1(!);u2(!);:::;uk(!);:::;ul(!);:::;uN(!);V1)
= h1(!1;!2;:::;!l;:::;!k;:::;!N;u1(!);u2(!);:::;ul(!);:::;uk(!);:::;uN(!);V1)
for all exchangeable value functions, k ¸ 2, and all l ¸ 2.
While we have stated assumption 5 in terms of the local income functions to facilitate
the adaptation of our existence proof to other models, it is readily tied to the model's
primitives.
Lemma 1 Assumption 5 is satis¯ed provided that (i) the pro¯t functions are symmetric
and anonymous, i.e.,
¼n(!1;:::;!n¡1;!n;!n+1;:::;!N) = ¼1(!n;:::;!n¡1;!1;!n+1;:::;!N)
for all n and
¼1(!1;!2;:::;!k;:::;!l;:::;!N) = ¼1(!1;!2;:::;!l;:::;!k;:::;!N)















for all k ¸ 1 and all l ¸ 1.
The proof of lemma 1 is straightforward but tedious and therefore omitted. Note that in
the special case of independent transitions, condition (ii) of lemma 1 is satis¯ed whenever the
factors Pn(¢) of the transition function P(¢) are the same across ¯rms, i.e., Pn(!0
n;!n;Ân(!;Án);xn(!)) =
P1(!0
n;!n;Ân(!;Án);xn(!)) for all n.
Together with assumptions 1, 2, and 4 in Section 4.1, assumption 5 ensures existence of
a symmetric and anonymous equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under assumptions 1, 2, 4, and 5, a symmetric and anonymous equilibrium
exists in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment strategies.
The idea of the proof is as follows. Symmetry allows us to restrict attention to the
best-reply correspondence of ¯rm 1. We enforce anonymity by rede¯ning the state space to
make it impossible for ¯rm 1 to tailor its policy to the identity of its rivals. The argument in
Section 4.1 implies that there exists a ¯xed point to a suitably de¯ned best-reply correspon-
dence of ¯rm 1. The ¯xed point is used to construct a candidate equilibrium by specifying
symmetric and anonymous policies for all ¯rms. Since the associated value functions are
also symmetric and anonymous, the argument is completed by exploiting the symmetry and
anonymity of the local income functions to show that no ¯rm has an incentive to deviate
from the candidate equilibrium.
Before stating the proof we need to establish some notation. We begin with de¯ning the
reduced state space. Consider ¯rm n and state !. De¯ne ¾n = (¾n;1;:::;¾n;M;¾n;M+1) 2
§ ½ f0;1;:::;N ¡ 1gM+1, where ¾n;m denotes the number of competitors of ¯rm n that
are in state m (excluding ¯rm n), and rewrite ! as (!n;¾n). Let S± = ­ £ § denote
the reduced state space and S = ­N the full state space. De¯ne a function ¿n : S ! S±
such that ¿n(!) = (!n;¾n). For example, if N = 4, M = 3, and ! = (3;2;2;4), then
(!1;¾1) = ¿1(!) = (3;0;2;0;1) and (!3;¾3) = ¿3(!) = (2;0;1;1;1). Note that the reduced






< (M + 1)N = jSj states.15
15Gowrisankaran (1999) develops an algorithm for the e±cient representation of the reduced state space.
26De¯ne also the inverse function ¿¡1
n : S± ! S such that ! = ¿¡1
n (!n;¾n) is an arbitrary
(but ¯xed) selection from the set f!j(!n;¾n) = ¿n(!)g. For example, the state of the
industry ! = ¿¡1
n (!n;¾n) may satisfy !1 · !2 · ::: · !n¡1 · !n+1 · ::: · !N. Note
that, if · ! = ¿¡1
n (¿n(!)), then · ! is obtained from ! by rearranging the elements of !¡n.
More speci¯cally, · !n = !·n for some permutation (·1;:::;·N) of (1;:::;N) with ·n = n,
i.e., · ! may di®er from ! in all but the nth element.
Next we rede¯ne actions, strategies, and payo®s on the reduced state space. We use the
symbol ± to distinguish objects de¯ned on the reduced state space from the corresponding
objects de¯ned on the full state space. For example, we write u±
1(!1;¾1) 2 U±
1(!1;¾1) instead
of u1(!) 2 U1(!), where U±
1(!1;¾1) = U1(¿¡1
1 (!1;¾1)) because U1(!) merely hinges on !1





de¯ned on the reduced state space by construction satis¯es anonymity. In terms of the
reduced state space, a symmetric equilibrium is one in which all ¯rms use the same strategy,
i.e., u±
n(!n;¾n) = u±
1(!n;¾n) for all !n and all ¾n. Turning to payo®s, we take the local

















where ¤n maps a value (or policy) function de¯ned on the reduced state space to a value
(or policy) function de¯ned on the full state space such that Vn = ¤n(V ±
1 ) i®
Vn(!) = V ±
1 (¿n(!))
for all !.
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N-1 times
):
The maximal return function V ±¤
1;u±






¡1. Note that (i) V ±¤
1;u±
¡1
is well-de¯ned due to assumption 1 and (ii) that there is no circularity involved in its
construction because u±
1 (and hence u±
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¡1) for all (!1;¾1)
)
:(21)
where the maximal return function V ±¤
1;u±







tions 1, 2, and 4, a u±
1 2 U±
1 exists such that u±
1 2 ¨±
1(u±
1). To see this, note that as in
the proof of proposition 1 ¨±
1(¢) is non-empty, single-valued, and upper hemi-continuous
and thus a function to which Brouwer's ¯xed point theorem applies. Third, construct a
candidate equilibrium by using u±




By construction, the above policy functions are symmetric and anonymous.
The ¯nal step is to show that no ¯rm has an incentive to deviate from the candidate
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let V ±¤
1;u±
¡1 denote the maximal return function correspond-
ing to u±
1, i.e., V ±¤
1;u±










n's value function on the full state space by
V ¤
n;u¡n = ¤n(V ±¤
1;u±
¡1): (23)
By construction, the above value functions are symmetric and anonymous.
The key to the proof is to note that the policy functions in equation (22) satisfy a prop-
erty stronger than symmetry and anonymity: if · ! is obtained by rearranging the elements
of !, i.e., · !n = !·n for some permutation (·1;:::;·N) of (1;:::;N), then we have
un(· !) = u±
1(¿n(· !))
= u±




1(¿·n(!)) = u·n(!): (24)
In particular, if ·n = n, then we have un(· !) = un(!).
Equation (24) allows us to show that the problem of ¯rm n in state ! is identical to the
problem of ¯rm 1 in state · ! where · ! is obtained by switching the ¯rst with the nth element
of !, i.e., · !n = !·n for (·1;·2;:::;·n¡1;·n;·n+1;:::;·N) = (n;2;:::;n¡1;1;n+1;:::;N).
28In fact, we have U1(· !) = Un(!) and
h1(· !;u1(· !);u2(· !);:::;un¡1(· !);un(· !);un+1(· !);:::;uN(· !);V ¤
1;u¡1)




where the ¯rst equality follows from equation (24) and the second uses the symmetry of the
value and local income functions. It thus remains to show the following:
u1(!) 2 arg sup
~ u1(!)2U1(!)





h1(!; ~ u1(!);u¡1(!);V ¤
1;u¡1)
for all !. That is, (i) taking the value function in equation (23) as given, ¯rm 1 has no
incentive to deviate from the policy function in equation (22) and (ii) the value function in
equation (23) coincides with the maximal return function of ¯rm 1.
A state ! is called canonical i® ! = ¿¡1
1 (!1;¾1) for some (!1;¾1). Fix a state !. If





































where the ¯rst equality follows from equations (22) and (23) and the last from the de¯nition
of the local income function h±
1(¢). Moreover, we have U1(!) = U1(¿¡1
1 (!1;¾1)) = U±
1(!1;¾1).
The fact that u±
1(!1;¾1) 2 U±







¡1 (see the de¯nition of ¨±
1(¢) in equation (21)) therefore implies that u1(!) 2 U1(!)
is optimal given u2(!);:::;uN(!) and V ¤
1;u¡1. Hence, (i) ¯rm 1 has no incentive to deviate
in the canonical state !. (ii) now follows from (i) using V ¤






If state ! is not canonical, then a canonical state · ! can be obtained from ! by rear-
ranging the elements of !¡1. Formally, · !n = !·n for some permutation (·1;:::;·N) of
(1;:::;N) with ·1 = 1, i.e., · ! may di®er from ! in all but the ¯rst element. We have
29U1(· !) = U1(!) and
h1(· !;u1(· !);u2(· !);:::;uN(· !);V ¤
1;u¡1)
= h1(· !;u1(!);u·2(!);:::;u·N(!);V ¤
1;u¡1)






where the ¯rst equality follows from equation (24) and the last equality uses the anonymity
of the value and local income functions. That is, the problem of ¯rm 1 in the non-canonical
state ! is identical to the problem of ¯rm 1 in the canonical state · !. But we have already
shown that (i) and (ii) hold in a canonical state.
4.3 Convergence
In this section we relate our game with random scrap values/setup costs to the game of
complete information. To do so, we write ¯rm n's scrap value as Á + ²µn if !n 6= M + 1
and its setup cost as Áe + ²µe
n if !n = M + 1, where ² > 0 is a constant scale factor that
measures the importance of incomplete information. Overloading notation, we assume that
µn » F(¢) and µe
n » Fe(¢) with E(µn) = E(µe
n) = 0.
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Corollary 1 in Section 4.1 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in cuto® entry/exit
and pure investment strategies for any ¯xed ² > 0. Note that h0
n(¢) is the local income
function that obtains in a game of complete information. As we have already pointed out,
there is a need to allow for mixed entry/exit strategies in a game with deterministic scrap
values/setup costs such as Ericson & Pakes (1995). We thus ask if the equilibrium of the
game of incomplete information converges to the equilibrium in mixed entry/exit strategies
as ² approaches zero. The following proposition gives an a±rmative answer.
Proposition 3 Suppose assumptions 1, 2, and 4 hold and consider a sequence f²lg such
that liml!1 ²l = 0. Let fulg be a corresponding sequence of equilibria in cuto® entry/exit
strategies such that liml!1 ul = u. Then u is an equilibrium in mixed entry/exit strategies.
30Proof. Let fV ²l





n;ul. Repeating the argument that led to equation (16) in Section 4.1 shows
that each element of fV ²l
ulg is well-de¯ned due to assumption 1. Moreover, since H²
n;uVn is
continuous in ² and u for all Vn, lemma 3.2 of Whitt (1980) implies that the return function
V ²
n;u is continuous in ² and u. Let Vn;u = liml!1 V ²l
n;ul for all n.
The proof proceeds in two steps. In the ¯rst step, we verify that the limiting strategies
un are optimal given the return function Vn;u for all n. In the second step, we verify that
the return function Vn;u coincides with the maximal return function for all n.
Suppose un(!) 62 argsup~ un(!)2Un(!) h0
n(!; ~ un(!);u¡n(!);Vn;u) for some ! and some n.
Then there exists ~ un(!) 2 Un(!) such that
h0
n(!; ~ un(!);u¡n(!);Vn;u) > h0
n(!;un(!);u¡n(!);Vn;u):
Since h²










for all l ¸ L. Hence, ul
n(!) 62 argsup~ un(!)2Un(!) h²l
n(!; ~ un(!);ul
¡n(!);V ²l
n;ul) and we obtain
a contradiction.
It remains to verify that the return function Vn;u coincides with the maximal return
function for all n. By construction V ²l
n;ul satis¯es V ²l
n;ul(!) = h²l
n(!;ul(!);V ²l
n;ul) for all !.
Taking limits on both sides shows that Vn;u satis¯es Vn;u(!) = h0
n(!;u(!);Vn;u) for all !.






for all !. Since Vn;u is a ¯xed point of the maximal return operator of the game of complete
information, it is the maximal return function.
Note that proposition 3 does not imply that liml!1 ul exists. On the other hand, since
U is compact every sequence fulg has a convergent subsequence, and proposition 3 applies
to the subsequential limit. This establishes
Corollary 2 Under assumptions 1, 2, and 4, an equilibrium exists in mixed entry/exit and
pure investment strategies in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model.
5 A Su±cient Condition for Pure Investment Strategies
Assumption 4 requires that the local income function hn(!;1;xn(!);u¡n(!);Vn) is max-
imized at a unique investment choice xn(!) for all u¡n(!), Vn 2 [V ¤;V
¤]jSj, !, and all
n. This is restrictive because, in general, the value function Vn of ¯rm n and the actions
31u¡n(!) of its rivals may take on values such that hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) attains its maximum
at more than one investment level. To see the role assumption 4 plays, suppose for the mo-
ment that it is violated. Then ¨n(¢), the best-reply correspondence of ¯rm n, is no longer
guaranteed to be a function, thus necessitating the use of Kakutani's instead of Brouwer's
¯xed point theorem. Kakutani's ¯xed point theorem, in turn, requires convex-valuedness of
¨n(¢). Using standard arguments, convex-valuedness can be ensured by allowing for mixed
investment strategies. This, however, is not practical because computing mixed strategies
over continuous actions is well beyond present computational capabilities.
Fortunately, a judicious choice of transition probabilities guarantees that the investment
choice is unique. In this section we de¯ne unique investment choice (UIC) admissibility of
the transition function P(¢) and show in proposition 4 that if this condition on the model's
primitives is satis¯ed and if the upper bounds ¹ x and ¹ xe on investment are su±ciently large,
then an equilibrium in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment strategies exists. We then
give a series of examples of transition functions that are UIC admissible and provide a
reasonable amount of °exibility. We close this section by showing that UIC admissibility
rules out equilibria that involve mixed investment strategies.
Condition 1 The transition function P(¢) is unique investment choice (UIC) admissible
if, for all »¡n(!), xn(!), Vn 2 [V ¤;V
¤]jSj, !, and all n, the expected value of ¯rm n's future
cash °ow, EfVn(!0)j!;!0
n 6= M +1;»¡n(!);x(!)g, in its local income function hn(¢) can be

















where, for all !0
n, Qn(!0








2 + bn;!xn (!) + cn;!
(26)
with either (i) an;! > 0 and bn;! ¸ 0 or (ii) an;! = 0 and bn;! 6= 0:
UIC admissibility ensures that ¯rm n's local income function hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) has at
most one extreme point in the interval (0; ¹ x) (or in the interval (0; ¹ xe) if ¯rm n is an entrant
rather than an incumbent). Taken by itself, UIC admissibility does not su±ce to ensure
a unique investment choice because investing zero may be just as good as investing ¹ x (or
¹ xe). To rule this out, we stipulate that the upper bounds ¹ x and ¹ xe on investment are large
enough never to constrain ¯rms' optimal investment choices. Speci¯cally, we assume that ¹ x
and ¹ xe are larger than ¯(V
¤¡V ¤) where V
¤ and V ¤ are the bounds on the maximal return
function V ¤
n;u¡n given in equations (19) and (20). This is mathematically innocuous since
¹ x and ¹ xe can always be chosen to be arbitrarily large. It is, however, a genuine constraint
to the extent that it rules out models in which investment choices are limited, for example
32because of cash constraints.16
We are now ready to state our main result establishing that a computationally tractable
equilibrium exists in the modi¯ed Ericson & Pakes (1995) model.
Proposition 4 Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If the transition function P(¢) is UIC
admissible and ¹ x and ¹ xe are ¯nite and larger than ¯(V
¤ ¡ V ¤), then an equilibrium exists
in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment strategies. If in addition assumption 5 holds, then
a symmetric and anonymous equilibrium exists in cuto® entry/exit and pure investment
strategies.
Proof. In light of corollary 1 and proposition 2, it su±ces to show that assumption 4
holds. Since the proof for a potential entrant is the same with ¹ xe replacing ¹ x, we focus on
the investment problem of an incumbent ¯rm in what follows.
We begin by ruling out ¹ x as an optimal investment choice. To do so, we show that it is
always better to invest zero than to invest ¹ x. By construction of V
¤ and V ¤,
hn(:::;1; ¹ x;:::) · ¼n(!) ¡ ¹ x + ¯V
¤; hn(:::;1;0;:::) ¸ ¼n(!) ¡ 0 + ¯V ¤:
Hence, hn(:::;1; ¹ x;:::) ¡ hn(:::;1;0;:::) · ¡¹ x + ¯(V
¤ ¡ V ¤) < 0 where the last inequal-
ity follows from our assumption that ¹ x > ¯(V
¤ ¡ V ¤). This implies ¯rst that ¹ x cannot
be an optimal investment choice and second that hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) must be decreasing
somewhere on [0; ¹ x].
Next we di®erentiate hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) with respect to xn (!). Since P (¢) is UIC
admissible, the FOC for an unconstrained solution to ¯rm n's investment problem is











2 + bn;!xn (!) + cn;!
:
Simplifying yields the quadratic equation 0 = an;!xn (!)






















Case (i): an;! > 0 and bn;! ¸ 0. Suppose ¯rst that b2
n;! ¡ 4an;!en;!;!0
n ¸ 0. Then there
are two roots (which may coincide) to the quadratic equation: the smaller root is negative
because bn;! ¸ 0 whereas the larger root,








16Of course, uniqueness of investment choice can also be achieved by other means. In particular, if ¹ x
e = 0,
then a potential entrant has no choice but to invest zero, thereby stripping the potential entrant of any
control over its initial position within the industry (as in Ericson & Pakes 1995).
33may be negative, zero, or positive.
The larger root ^ xn(!) is therefore the only candidate for an interior solution within
(0; ¹ x) to ¯rm n's investment problem. Moreover, the derivative of hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) with
respect to xn(!) can change sign at most once on [0; ¹ x]: If it never changes sign, then
hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) must be strictly decreasing on [0; ¹ x]. If it changes sign once on [0; ¹ x],
then ^ xn(!) 2 (0; ¹ x) must be either a local minimum or a local maximum.
1. hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) may be strictly decreasing on the interval [0; ¹ x]. Then the unique
maximizer is 0.
2. ^ xn(!) 2 (0; ¹ x) may be a local minimum. Then, on the interval [0; ¹ x], hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::)
is strictly decreasing (increasing) to the left (right) of ^ xn(!). Because ¹ x cannot be an
optimal investment choice, the unique maximizer is 0.
3. ^ xn(!) 2 (0; ¹ x) may be a local maximum. Then, on the interval [0; ¹ x], hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::)
is strictly increasing (decreasing) to the left (right) of ^ xn(!). Hence, the unique max-
imizer is ^ xn(!).
Suppose next that b2
n;! ¡ 4an;!en;!;!0
n < 0, so that the quadratic equation has no real
roots. Then hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) must be either strictly decreasing or strictly increasing
on [0; ¹ x]. But we have already established that hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) must be decreasing
somewhere on [0; ¹ x]; therefore it cannot possibly be strictly increasing on [0; ¹ x]. Hence,
hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) is strictly decreasing on [0; ¹ x], and the unique maximizer is 0.
Case (ii): an;! = 0 and bn;! 6= 0. The only candidate for an interior solution to ¯rm n's
investment problem is





Again the derivative of hn(:::;1;xn(!);:::) with respect to xn(!) can change sign at most
once on [0; ¹ x]. The remainder of the proof is identical to case (i).
UIC admissibility allows for much more °exibility in the transition probabilities than
the simple schemes seen in the extant literature where each ¯rm is restricted to each period
move up one state, stay the same, or drop down one state. We demonstrate this with a
series of increasingly complex examples all involving an industry with N = 2 ¯rms, M ¸ 3
\active" states, and no entry and exit.
Example: Independent transitions to immediately adjacent states. Consider a
game of capacity accumulation (see Besanko & Doraszelski 2002) where a ¯rm's state de-
scribes its capacity. In each period, the ¯rm decides how much to spend on an investment
project in order to add to its capacity. If ¯rm n invests xn(!) ¸ 0, then the probability






2 = !2 + 1 !0
2 = !2 !0
2 = !2 ¡ 1
!0
1 = !1 + 1 (1 ¡ ±)p1(1 ¡ ±)p2 (1 ¡ ±)p1[±p2 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p2)] (1 ¡ ±)p1±p2
!0
1 = !1
[±p1 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p1)]
£(1 ¡ ±)p2
[±p1 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p1)]
£[±p2 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p2)]
[±p1 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p1)]
£±p2
!0
1 = !1 ¡ 1 ±(1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ ±)p2 ±(1 ¡ p1)[±p2 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p2)] ±(1 ¡ p1)±p2
Table 4: Transition probabilities. Independent transitions to immediately adjacent states.
where the parameter ® > 0 measures the e®ectiveness of investment. Depreciation tends to
o®set investment, and we assume that each ¯rm is independently hit by a depreciation shock
with probability ±. The transition probabilities at an interior state ! 2 f2;:::;M ¡1g2 are
given in Table 4.17
Without loss of generality, consider ¯rm 1. For the case of !0
1 = !1, the expected value
of its future cash °ow is
[±p1 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p1)]f(1 ¡ ±)p2V1(!1;!2 + 1) + [±p2 + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p2)]V1(!1;!2)
+±p2V1(!1;!2 ¡ 1)g









This expression satis¯es the separability condition (25), as do the corresponding expressions
for the cases of !0
1 = !1 + 1 and !0








2 + 2®x1 (!) + 1
:
Example: Dependent transitions to immediately adjacent states. Next we intro-
duce correlation into ¯rms' transitions by replacing the ¯rm-speci¯c depreciation shocks of
the above example by an industry-wide depreciation shock (e.g., Pakes & McGuire 1994).
Decompose, for purposes of exposition, the transition of each ¯rm into two stages. In the
¯rst stage the probability that ¯rm n's state increases by one is again given by pn. In the
second stage a depreciation shock reduces the states of all ¯rms by one with probability ±.
The transition probabilities at an interior state ! 2 f2;:::;M ¡ 1g2 are given in Table 5.
For the sake of brevity, we just spell out the expected value of ¯rm 1's future cash °ow
17Edge states must be treated specially. If !n = 1, then the probability of moving up to state !
0
n = 2
(remaining in state !
0
n = 1) is (1 ¡ ±)pn (±pn); if !n = M, then the probability of dropping down to state
!
0
n = M ¡ 1 (remaining in state !
0
n = M) is ±(1 ¡ pn) (1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ pn)).
35!0
2 = !2 + 1 !0
2 = !2 !0
2 = !2 ¡ 1
!0
1 = !1 + 1 (1 ¡ ±)p1p2 (1 ¡ ±)p1 (1 ¡ p2) 0
!0
1 = !1 (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p1)p2 (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2) + ±p1p2 ±p1 (1 ¡ p2)
!0
1 = !1 ¡ 1 0 ± (1 ¡ p1)p2 ± (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)
Table 5: Transition probabilities. Dependent transitions to immediately adjacent states.
in case of !0
1 = !1,
(1 ¡ p1)f(1 ¡ ±)p2V1 (!1;!2 + 1) + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p2)V1 (!1;!2)g
+p1 f±p2V1 (!1;!2) + ± (1 ¡ p2)V1 (!1;!2 ¡ 1)g









and note that conditions (25) and (26) are again both satis¯ed.
Example: Dependent transitions to arbitrary states. Using the above two-stage
decomposition much more °exible transitions can be constructed. In the ¯rst stage ¯rm
n's investment xn(!) determines a set of transition probabilities to all possible active ¯rm
states. For example, the probability that ¯rm n moves from its initial state !n to the
intermediate state ^ !n 2 f1;:::;Mg may be
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :




³n;!n;!n¡1 + ´n;!n;!n¡1 pn if ^ !n = !n ¡ 1;
³n;!n;!n + ´n;!n;!n pn if ^ !n = !n;




³n;!n;M + ´n;!n;M pn if ^ !n = M;
where xn(!) a®ects the probability of a transition from state !n to state ^ !n either positively
of negatively depending on the sign of ´n;!n;^ !n.18 Clearly, pn does not have to equal
®xn(!)
1+®xn(!);
it can be of any form that satis¯es the derivative condition (26). In the second stage,
the industry transits from its intermediate state ^ ! to its ¯nal state !0 according to some
arbitrary, exogenously given probabilities that may depend on ^ !.
18The parameters ³n;!n;^ !n and ´n;!n;^ !n must be chosen to ensure that the probabilities stay in the
unit interval for all xn(!) 2 [0; ¹ x] and sum to one. In particular, this requires
PM
^ !n=1 ³n;!n;^ !n = 1 and
PM
^ !n=1 ´n;!n;^ !n = 0.
36Mixed investment strategies. From the outset we have restricted attention to pure in-
vestment strategies. Under assumption 4 the unique best reply to pure investment strategies
x¡n (!) is a pure investment strategy xn (!). An equilibrium in pure investment strategies
therefore remains an equilibrium even if mixed investment strategies are allowed.
But we can say more: UIC admissibility rules out equilibria that involve mixed in-
vestment strategies. Consider the decision problem of ¯rm n when the other ¯rms mix on
their actions u¡n (!), including their investments, according to the distribution ª(u¡n (!)).

























































Hence, assumption 4 holds, and ¯rm n's best reply is unique and cannot be mixed.
6 Multiplicity
In this section we discuss three examples that show that there need not be a unique equi-
librium that is symmetric and anonymous.
Example: Investment decisions. We build on the game of capacity accumulation from
Section 5. There are N = 2 ¯rms with M ¸ 3 \active" states. In state !n ¯rm n's capacity
is ¹ q!n. Transitions are limited to immediately adjacent states and are independent across
¯rms.19 Products are undi®erentiated and ¯rms compete in prices subject to capacity
constraints. There are m identical consumers with unit demand and reservation price v. The
equilibrium of this Bertrand-Edgeworth product market game is characterized in Chapter
2 of Ghemawat (1997). Let ¼(!1;!2) denote ¯rm 1's current pro¯t in state ! = (!1;!2).
Symmetry implies that ¯rm 2's current pro¯t in state ! is ¼(!2;!1). Table 6 gives the
parameters values.
Figure 1 illustrates the value and policy functions of two equilibria. The di®erence
in investment activity is greatest in state (5;5) where both ¯rms invest 1:90 in the ¯rst
equilibrium compared to 1:03 in the second one. Investment activity also di®ers considerably
19Because the transition function P(¢) is UIC admissible, it is guaranteed that nonuniqueness is not due
to a violation of Assumption 4.
37parameter M ¹ q1 ¹ q2 ::: ¹ q10 v m ® ± ¯
value 10 0 5 ::: 45 1 10 2.375 0.03 1
1:05






















































































































1;6) and (6;1): in the ¯rst (second) equilibrium the smaller ¯rm invests 2:24 (3:92)
and the larger ¯rm invests 1:57 (1:46). Nevertheless, the two equilibria are qualitatively
similar. This is especially troublesome because there is little hope of using empirical evidence
to distinguish between these equilibria. However, the importance of multiplicity would
greatly diminish if it could be shown that all equilibria are generally alike.
The computations were performed using a Matlab 5.3 implementation of the Pakes
& McGuire (1994) algorithm. The ¯rst equilibrium was computed using a Gauss-Jacobi
scheme to update the value and policy functions, the second using a Gauss-Seidel scheme
(see e.g. Judd 1998). This is worth noting because many applications of Ericson & Pakes's
(1995) framework have searched for multiple equilibria by selecting a single algorithm and
varying the starting values. Our example makes clear that this approach may fail and may
thus lead one to falsely conclude that multiplicity is not an issue.
Example: Entry/exit decisions. In the above example nonuniqueness results solely
from ¯rms' investment decisions in a model without entry and exit. In contrast, Pakes &
38McGuire (1994) have conjectured that nonuniqueness may result from ¯rms' exit decisions.
This is easily seen by slightly extending our example with random scrap values/setup costs
from Section 3. In particular, suppose that each ¯rm can now be in one of two \active"
states (i.e., M = 2) and that the current pro¯t in states (1;1), (1;2), (2;1), and (2;2)
is the same. Suppose ¯nally that a ¯rm cannot transit between its active states (in the
above example this corresponds to a situation with ine®ective investment (® = 0) and zero
depreciation (± = 0)). Then one symmetric equilibrium has both ¯rms play the cuto®
exit strategies from Section 3 in states (1;1), (1;2), (2;1), and (2;2). But there are other
equilibria: For example, both ¯rms play the cuto® exit strategies in states (1;1) and (2;2).
In state (1;2) ¯rm 1 exits for sure and ¯rm 2 stays for sure whereas in state (2;1) ¯rm 1
stays for sure and ¯rm 2 exits for sure. This clearly shows how the symmetry requirement
may fail to rule out all but one equilibrium.
Example: Product market competition. We close this section by noting that we
treat the current pro¯t function ¼n(¢) as a primitive. Instead we could have gone back to
demand and cost fundamentals and explicitly modelled competition in the product market.
To the extent that this game admits more than one equilibrium ¼n(¢) fails to be determined
uniquely, thereby making product market competition yet another source of multiplicity.
7 Conclusions
This paper establishes a solid foundation of the Ericson & Pakes (1995) model of dynamic
competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit. We show that exis-
tence of a MPE in the Ericson & Pakes (1995) game of complete information requires mixed
entry/exit strategies, contrary to their assertion. This is problematic from a computational
point of view because the existing algorithms|notably Pakes & McGuire (1994, 2001)|
cannot cope with mixed strategies. We therefore introduce ¯rm heterogeneity in the form
of randomly drawn, privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model. We show
that the resulting game of incomplete information always has a MPE in cuto® entry/exit
strategies and is computationally no more demanding than the original game of complete
information.
Adding random scrap values/setup costs formally leads to a dynamic stochastic game
with compact and convex action spaces given by the probability that an incumbent ¯rm
remains in the industry/a potential entrant enters the industry and the set of feasible in-
vestment choices. Since computing mixed strategies over continuous actions is well beyond
present computational capabilities, it is vital to ensure existence of a MPE in pure invest-
ment strategies in addition to cuto® entry/exit strategies. We achieve this in our proofs
by ¯rst assuming that a ¯rm's investment choice always is uniquely determined. We then
show that this assumption is satis¯ed provided the transition function is UIC admissible.
39This, in fact, is a key contribution because UIC admissibility is de¯ned with respect to the
model's primitives and is easily checked.
We build on our basic existence result in several ways. We ¯rst show that a symmetric
and anonymous MPE exists provided the model's primitives are symmetric and anonymous.
This is a major result for two reasons. First, from a computational viewpoint, symmetry
and anonymity are needed to control the size of the state space. Second, from a substantive
viewpoint, in models of dynamic competition with entry and exit, there is often no com-
pelling reason why a particular entrant should be di®erent from any other entrant. This
makes a symmetric and anonymous MPE an especially compelling solution concept because,
in such a MPE, ¯rm heterogeneity arises endogenously from the idiosyncratic outcomes that
the ex ante identical ¯rms realize from their investments. To our knowledge, this is the ¯rst
attempt to guarantee existence of a symmetric and anonymous MPE in a broad class of
dynamic stochastic games.20 Our arguments are readily extended to arbitrary dynamic
stochastic games.
Next we show that, as the distribution of the random scrap values/setup costs becomes
degenerate, MPEs in cuto® entry/exit strategies converge to MPEs in mixed entry/exit
strategies of the game of complete information. We have been unable to determine whether
or not the approachability part of Harsanyi's (1973) puri¯cation theorem carries over from
static games to dynamic stochastic games. That is, are all MPEs of the original game
approached by some MPE of the perturbed game as the perturbation vanishes? We leave
this as an open question for future research.
Finally, we provide the ¯rst example of multiple symmetric and anonymous MPEs in the
literature spawned by Ericson & Pakes (1995). While this formally settles the uniqueness
issue, it is just an initial step. In fact, little is known to date about uniqueness of MPE
in dynamic stochastic games. Haller & Laguno® (2000) show that the number of MPEs is
generically ¯nite and Amir (2002) shows that there exists a unique MPE in pure strategies
in ¯nite horizon games that satisfy the same monotonicity, supermodularity, and dominant-
diagonal conditions that Curtat (1996) adopted in his earlier paper. More research along
these lines is clearly needed.
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